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La secularización era el nombre falso del 
fetichismo; y el ateísmo de las izquierdas era 
un primer momento dialéctico, cuyo segundo 
momento era una afrmación del Absoluto como 
liberación.1 
– Enrique Dussel 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been something of an accepted but misunderstood 
refrain that Latin American liberation philosophy employs 
the methods and approaches of liberation theology in the 
philosophical arena, efectively putting liberation theology 
on secular grounds.2 While this formulation is true insofar 
as philosophy is not bound by the hermeneutics of any 
particular religious tradition, a closer reading of both 
movements’ methodologies complicates the presumed 
meaning of secularity in this interpretation. On the one 
hand, liberation theology is already partly secular in that 
it deploys the social sciences to diagnose and chastise 
the sinful character of material oppression. On the other 
hand, liberation philosophy afrms secularization as a 
methodological separation between faith and reason, but 
not rooted in an undialectical understanding of secularity 
as secularism.3 This essay clarifes the nature of liberation 
philosophy’s secular grounds. 
While not the sole representative of liberation philosophy, 
I center the work of Enrique Dussel, as his intellectual 
production spans both liberation philosophy and liberation 
theology. His work is thus the most capacious entryway 
into the relationship between these two movements. I 
demonstrate how liberation philosophy’s secularity is 
not one that disavows religion, as with the undialectical 
understanding of secularity as secularism. On the contrary, 
liberation philosophy’s secular grounds require a constant 
engagement with religion, not in the hermeneutics of 
any specifc tradition, but with “the traditional question 
of the Absolute.”4 This way of doing philosophy contrasts 
with the secularist repudiation of religion that dominates 
within much of philosophy’s radical circles, which is why 
liberation philosophy has repeatedly been “ghettoized 
and relegated to the ‘safe’ area of theological studies,” 
as Eduardo Mendieta has argued.5 It is my contention, 
however, that liberation philosophy’s secular grounds are 
an original contribution to philosophy that can provide the 
foundation for a decolonial and postsecularist liberation 
philosophy, particularly a liberation philosophy of religion. 
This would be an account of religion with an ethico-political 
existential dimension as humanity’s liberatory search 
for meaning, expressed as the search for the Absolute. 
Moreover, I argue that this dialectical modality of secularity 
advances epistemic decolonization, for it reveals the 
undialectical understanding of secularity as secularism 
to be an aspect of coloniality, an obstacle rather than a 
beneft for Latin American philosophers seeking to gain a 
better understanding of our historical conditions.6 
LIBERATION PHILOSOPHY’S SECULAR GROUNDS
Both liberation theology and liberation philosophy 
emerged in Latin America in the late 1960s within the social 
and political struggles that sought to improve the living 
conditions of the vast majority of the region’s population. 
On the theological front, fgures like Rubem Alves, Hugo 
Assmann, and Gustavo Gutierrez broke with centuries-
old theological paradigms to embrace the secular social 
sciences—particularly Latin American dependency 
theory—to develop an understanding of poverty as the 
result of the sinful character of neocolonial oppression.7 
In the philosophical trenches, Leopoldo Zea and Augusto 
Salazar Bondy had set the terms of a debate concerning 
the possibility of an authentic Latin American philosophy.8 
As a response to this debate, a group of Argentine 
philosophers that included Rodolfo Kusch, Juan Carlos 
Scannone, Horacio Cerutti, and Enrique Dussel, among 
others, developed the basis of a philosophical refection 
that would contribute to the struggles that were shaping 
the course of Latin American history. This is how liberation 
philosophy was born.9 
Enrique Dussel quickly emerged as a noted contributor 
to both movements while maintaining a strict division 
between the two, with philosophy geared toward a 
universal secular community of reason and theology toward 
a particular religious community of faith.10 Despite such a 
clear separation, however, liberation philosophy has often 
been discredited for its close association to its theological 
counterpart––thereby purportedly lacking originality and 
depth. Yet I argue that it is precisely liberation philosophy’s 
secularity that ofers one of its most distinctive and original 
contributions to philosophy, in large part because of its 
unconventional construction of secularity; that is, it is not 
positioned in direct opposition to the religious. That such 
unconventional secularity has yet to receive comprehensive 
attention is why the seemingly “religious” language of 
liberation philosophy continues to bafe its critics. Where 
some see a theology in disguise, I see an audaciously 
atheist liberatory philosophy, especially when it comes to 
the philosophy of religion. 
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To clarify this point, it is necessary to articulate how Dussel 
deploys secularity as a broad framework for liberation 
philosophy. In addition to the aforementioned interpretation 
of secularization as a methodological separation between 
theology and philosophy (the classic faith-and-reason 
debate), there is a prior and more important understanding 
of secularization that connotes a certain atheism. One of 
the frst prominent historical examples of this modality 
is found, somewhat ironically, in the early messianic 
communities that would go on to form Christianity. When 
these early Christians defended a belief in the Divine as 
“transcendental exteriority,” as the Other to the Roman 
cosmos, they contradicted the latter’s intrinsic divinity in 
a way that precipitated an accusation of atheism and their 
subsequent persecution.11 In conceiving of the cosmos as 
“created, that is, not-God,” these early Christians initiated 
a process of secularization that would eventually give way 
to the empirical study of God’s creation.12 Put diferently, 
because the cosmos is not-God, it can be studied with tools 
other than revelation. The atheism of a self-proclaimed 
divinity (the negation of the Roman cosmos) thus becomes 
the precursor to the methodological separation between 
reason and revelation, between philosophy and theology 
as independent domains. This separation would become 
one of modernity’s essential epistemic divisions. 
The historical irony of the Christian origin of secularization 
was crystallized in the Renaissance, when Christian 
theology confronted the latest conclusions from the 
empirical sciences. No longer the wretched of the Roman 
Empire but an imperial force in its own right, the Church 
now found itself in a powerful position of social, political, 
and cultural domination. At this historical juncture, Dussel 
argues, the Church had the opportunity to deepen the 
process of secularization that once gave birth to it by 
articulating that scientifc rationality is not “in opposition 
to the values necessary to faith,” and embracing it.13 The 
Church, however, did not defend such separation between 
faith and reason—itself an outgrowth of Christianity’s own 
secularizing emergence—and instead rejected the new 
scientifc forms of knowledge, creating “an antinomy that 
should never have been: science versus Christianity.”14 The 
dialectics of secularization initiated by the atheistic critique 
of the Roman cosmos thus came to a halt and ended 
the fruitful complementarity between faith and reason. 
The Medieval Church’s failure to deepen the process of 
secularization by rejecting scientifc rationality resulted 
in an undialectical reaction. Solidifed as an antireligious 
secularism, this undialectical reaction has reigned in 
scientifc and philosophical circles ever since, most evident 
in the fgures and inheritors of the Radical Enlightenment. 
Contrary to the frst atheist modality and the second 
modality of complementarity between faith and reason, the 
undialectical modality of secularity as secularism disavows 
religion as a source of criticality and liberatory potential. 
That the dialectics of secularization came to a halt in 
modern secularism has conditioned the development of 
both liberation theology and liberation philosophy. Both 
movements are invested in moving away from secularism 
as an undialectical modality of secularity, thus jumpstarting 
the process of secularization from their own respective 
domains of inquiry. They each diagnose the modern 
secular/religious impasse as a type of fundamentalism 
that must be overcome. To that end, liberation theology 
famously reached out to the secular social sciences. 
Liberation philosophy followed suit, but on the other end 
of the divide. This is why liberation philosophy has been 
committed to developing a dialectically secular account of 
religion as a source of liberation that recovers the “atheist” 
modality critical of false divinities or “fetishes.” Such “anti-
fetishism” establishes liberation philosophy’s secular 
grounds. I shall now briefy outline this project. 
AN ATHEIST LIBERATION PHILOSOPHY OF
RELIGION 
A liberation philosophy of religion is systematically 
developed in the ffth volume of Dussel’s frst Ética, aptly 
subtitled, “An Antifetishist Philosophy of Religion.”15 This 
is a project that includes an analysis of “fetishization” as 
the process by which an entity encloses itself and assumes 
itself to be an absolute source of power and legitimacy.16 
It is an account of the self-divinization of the Same at 
the expense of the Other. This concept of fetishization 
sheds light on the aforementioned case of Christianity—a 
movement that started as a messianic and atheist anti-
imperialist project but became the religion of the Roman 
Empire. Such processes of fetishization saturated the 
Crusades, the colonization of the Americas, and the 
European wars of religion. Fetishization in this case denotes 
the self-enclosure of Christianity into the Absolute—i.e., 
into Christendom.17 
The task of the philosopher of liberation is to diagnose 
fetishization wherever it occurs. It means being atheist 
of the fetish that demands compulsory worship.18 Such 
atheism, as the “negation of the negation,” is indeed “the 
frst thesis of Liberation Philosophy.”19 Here, the religious 
moment par excellence is that which comes after the 
negation of the fetish; it is the afrmation that “Divinity 
is Other than any system.”20 In other words, the negation 
of the false divinity is itself substantiated by the positive 
afrmation that true Divinity can only be found beyond 
the system, as the Absolute Other. As “infnite exteriority,” 
the afrmation of the Absolute provides criteria “to accuse 
any system of being guilty.”21 Without such afrmation of 
infnite exteriority, any given system risks enclosing and 
absolutizing itself into a self-sufcient false divinity, a new 
fetish. Liberation philosophy essentially understands re-
ligion to be this anti-fetishist practice. It is the afrmation 
of the Absolute Other as true Divinity, as infnite exteriority, 
that gives one the footing to be an “atheist of every 
system.”22 
The radical aspect of this formulation of re-ligion as 
anti-fetishism is that secularism is understood as a new 
fetish—the merely reactionary undialectical rejoinder 
to the fetishization of Christianity; part of the problem 
and not a solution that can disrupt the process of 
fetishization. This is based on the understanding that 
secularism similarly does not leave room for exteriority 
and collapses into a practice of self-divination.23 Thus, 
Dussel characterizes such undialectical understanding of 
secularity as secularism as “the false name of fetishism.”24 
This intricate formulation—the epigraph to this essay— 
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criticizes an undialectical understanding of the process of 
secularization, exemplifed by a certain kind of Marxism, 
for its inadequacies in mounting a full critique of fetishism. 
For Dussel, the infamous Marxist critique of religion as “the 
opium of the people” rightly advocates for an atheism of the 
fetish.25 But in its inability to take the next step of afrming 
exteriority, Marxist critique closes on itself, thus leaving the 
possibility to emerge as a new fetish of its own (as seen in 
Soviet bureaucracy): “Forgetting the second moment has 
distanced the left from the peoples who explain their daily 
lives, in the Lebenswelt, with symbols, rituals, and cults.”26 
This is why secularization (as secularism) became the false 
name of fetishism. 
One of the original contributions of liberation philosophy, 
then, is the articulation of the second moment that follows 
the negation of the fetish missing in the Marxist critique of 
religion: “the afrmation of the Absolute as liberation.”27 
For if there is an Absolute, Dussel claims, “it ought to be 
Other than every historical system.”28 It is the afrmation 
of the Absolute as infnite exteriority, as “perfect justice,” 
that can trigger the dialectics of secularization once again, 
where secularization no longer implies fetishism.29 
Such articulation of liberation philosophy’s secularity has 
gone largely unnoticed in its reception, even amongst 
its supporters. For instance, Eduardo Mendieta’s English 
translation of this formulation partially obscures the 
fact that Dussel is here calling for the reinterpretation of 
the meaning of secularity. Mendieta translates the frst 
clause of this passage, originally in the past tense (“La 
secularización era el nombre falso del fetichismo”), into the 
English present tense (“Secularization is the false name of 
fetishism”).30 In my view, this slight modifcation makes it 
difcult to see (1) the fact that the process of secularization 
at some point went wrong, becoming “the false name of 
fetishism,” and (2) that restoring the properly dialectical 
and critical aspect of secularization is one of liberation 
philosophy’s crucial tasks. 
That such articulation of secularity has not received the 
careful attention that it deserves may also explain why 
components surrounding this reinterpretation have been 
a constant source of criticism, especially from other Latin 
American philosophers. Ofelia Schutte, for instance, fnds 
Dussel’s “critique of secular-scientifc education” to be 
“conservative in its stand against modernity.”31 From the 
very brief sketch I have ofered above, it should be clear 
that such criticism does not take into account the way in 
which liberation philosophy afrms secularization at the 
expense of rejecting secularism. In other words, it is true 
that liberation philosophy is critical of secularism, but 
because it is not secular enough. The rejection of secularism 
does not come from a reactionary religious intention, but 
from a radically atheist secularizing position that is just 
as critical of fundamentalist iterations of religion. This is 
the sense in which I argue that liberation philosophy’s 
critique of secularism should be understood as being both 
postsecularist and decolonial, insofar as secularism is to 
be overcome for being “an Eurocentric and metropolitan 
ideology typical of the colonialist expansion and fruit 
of the theoretical conception of the Enlightenment and 
liberalism.”32 In this formulation, liberation philosophy 
is prepared to contribute a specifcally Latin American 
decolonial position to the “postsecular debate” regarding 
the shifting roles of religion and secularity in late 
modernity.33 
More recently, Nelson Maldonado-Torres has similarly 
criticized the move in liberation philosophy to understand 
the afrmation of the Absolute as part of a praxis of 
liberation from domination. For Maldonado-Torres, this is a 
confation between the “trans-ontological” (beyond Being) 
and the “sub-ontological” (below Being) realms that, 
in his view, results in the problematic a priori normative 
grounding of liberation philosophy.34 While this is a point 
that I am unable to fully address in this essay, as it requires 
an exposition of analogy and revelation concerning 
transcendental and empirical alterities, it should be clear 
that the anti-fetishist methodology is also meant to avoid 
any such problematic collapses. The notion of fetishization 
is here utilized to understand the false absolutization of an 
entity. In this sense, the Absolute is what fully escapes our 
grasp, thereby avoiding false confations in any historical 
praxis of liberation. Liberation philosophy does argue, 
however, that the Absolute is expressed, for instance, in 
the popular imaginary of the oppressed. And far from being 
the exclusive domain of theology, it also ought to be the 
subject of philosophical interest. This is why philosophy 
cannot avoid “the God of the mythical narrative of the Latin 
American popular imaginary.”35 
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have sought to illuminate the nature of 
liberation philosophy’s secular grounds. The secularity to 
which liberation philosophy ascribes is not an undialectical 
modality of secularity as secularism, which disavows religion 
as a source of criticality and liberatory potential. On the 
contrary, liberation philosophy cultivates a secularity that 
retrieves a prior semantic meaning of secularization—an 
atheism of the fetish. Dialectical in nature, this modality of 
secularity respects re-ligion as the critique of the fetish.36 
It is therefore attuned to the ways in which re-ligion can 
and must provide sources of criticality and liberation within 
changing contexts of domination. From the perspective 
of liberation philosophy, secularism, as the undialectical 
modality of secularity, proves to be not the solution to 
fetishization but another shape of the fetish that has 
absolutized itself into a new totality. Liberation philosophy 
endeavors to overcome such limiting secularity by leaving 
room for the Absolute as true infnite exteriority; as the 
excess that escapes the system and thus grounds an anti-
systemic critique. The afrmation of this Absolute, as the 
regulative ideal of perfect justice, is the religious moment 
par excellence. There is, then, a religious element in all 
liberatory praxis. With this insight begins a postsecularist 
and decolonial liberation philosophy, especially a liberation 
philosophy of religion. 
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Radical Pluralism and the Hispanic
Identity 





In his writing, “Pragmatic Pluralism, Multiculturalism, and 
the New Hispanic,” José Medina argues for a pragmatic 
reconstruction of the Hispanic identity given the vast ethnic 
diversity within Latin American countries.1 As Hispanic 
cultural diferences have come under suspicion and a post-
ethnic American identity is often invoked, Medina urges 
that a reconstruction of Hispanic identity is needed now 
more than ever.2 To adequately articulate the nature of the 
Hispanic identity, he suggests that a pragmatic account of 
radical pluralism can allow us to reconstruct an intrinsically 
pluralist identity that is singular through shared collective 
experiences. For Medina, radical pluralism ofers the best 
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